ABSTRACT In recent times, we have witnessed an increasing concern by governments and intelligence agencies to deploy mass-surveillance systems that help them fight terrorism. Although a government may be perfectly legitimate to do so, it is questionable whether a preventive-surveillance state is rational and cost-effective. In this paper, we conduct a theoretical analysis of the cost of such surveillance systems. Our analysis starts with a fairly well-known result in statistics, namely, the false-positive paradox. We propose a quantitative measure of the total cost of a monitoring program, and study a detection system that is designed to minimize it, subject to a constraint in the percentage of terrorists the agency wishes to capture. Our formulation is first illustrated by means of several simple albeit insightful examples of terrorist and innocent profiles. Then, we conduct an extensive experimental study from real-world socio-demographic data of jihadist terrorism in the U.K. and Spain, and provide insight into the rationality and cost-effectiveness of two countries with two of the biggest defense budgets in the world.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of recent terrorism attacks, we have witnessed a significant increase of the level of surveillance conducted by governments around the world. An example is the signal intelligence law [25] approved by the French parliament after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, whereby intelligence agencies can spy on digital and mobile phone communications and emails of anyone linked to a ''terrorist'' behavior, without prior authorization from a judge [10] .
One of the most controversial elements of this law are the so-called ''black boxes'' which Internet service providers are forced to deploy, and which aim to analyze the meta-data of Internet users in search of potential terrorists. This has sparked protests from human rights groups who claim the law legalizes highly intrusive surveillance methods and amounts to mass surveillance of Web traffic on a disproportionately large scale, without guarantees for individual freedom and privacy [29] .
These meta-data monitoring systems, however, appear to have failed in most of the recent terrorist attacks. In Manchester, London and Paris, most terrorists had been flagged by the surveillance system and in some cases followed further investigation. Nonetheless, insufficient resources were put in place by the corresponding authorities to follow all them, and much criticism has been leveled against those governments by their lack of determination and resources put in it.
Although it is clearly legitimate for a government to actively fight terrorism, it is questionable whether the proposed current large-scale surveillance solution is really rational and will increase security at all. In particular, it is questionable whether this solution is cost-efficient, since it is expected, according to the false positive paradox, that many of the resources will also be spent analyzing the data of innocent people.
In this paper, we aim to provide insight into the overall cost of a surveillance system. Although mass surveillance is also questionable in terms of privacy, we decided to avoid this debate and, instead, focus our analysis on the cost-effectiveness of such system.
More specifically, we conduct a theoretical analysis of the said cost that revolves around the false-positive paradox, a fairly well-known result in statistics. We propose a quantitative measure of the total cost of a monitoring program, and assume a detection system that is designed to minimize it, given a desired percentage of terrorists the agency wishes to capture. We hasten to stress that the design of detection systems for counter-terrorism is out of the scope of this work. This work simply assumes cost-optimized detection with the intention solely of obtaining lower bounds on the cost of mass surveillance.
To illustrate our formulation and the different parameters involved in the design of a detection system, we first carry out a simplified cost analysis based on several insightful examples of terrorist and innocent profiles. Then, we apply the proposed cost model to investigate the economic cost of a real mass surveillance system. Our experimental evaluation relies on the socio-demographic profiles elaborated by [5] , [22] , [23] , and [27] of jihadists who committed suicide attacks or were convicted for Islamism-related terrorism offenses. On the basis of such profiles, which constitute the most comprehensive and detailed socio-demographic data of jihadist terrorism in Spain and the U.K, we examine the rationality and cost-effectiveness of mass surveillance in these two countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II establishes our notation and assumptions and reviews the false-positive paradox. Section III introduces a cost model and illustrates the proposed formulation with some simple, but insightful, examples of profiles. Section IV conducts an experimental evaluation of the proposed model with real-world data of jihadist terrorism. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we first describe our notation and terminology as well as the assumptions underlying the surveillance-system model. Secondly, we illustrate the false-positive paradox presented in the introductory section, which constitutes our starting point to analyze the cost of a mass surveillance.
A. NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
Throughout this work, we shall follow the convention of using uppercase letters to denote random variables (r.v.'s), and lowercase letters to the particular values they take on. The measurable space in which an r.v. takes on values will be called an alphabet. With a mild loss of generality, we shall always assume that the alphabet is discrete. Probability mass functions (PMFs) are denoted by p, subindexed by the corresponding r.v. Accordingly, p X (x) denotes the value of the function p X at x. We use the notations p X |Y and p X |Y (x|y) equivalently.
In the following, the r.v. X is used with full generality to include categorical or numerical data about an individual, although for mathematical simplicity we shall henceforth assume it models single-occurrence data, rather than tuples or sequences. X may represent, for example, the number of visited Web sites related to jihadism by an individual, the frequency with which this individual tweets fanatic, religious comments, or the number of social links that they actively maintain with extremists. Without loss of generality, we assume X takes on values on the alphabet {1, . . . , n}.
In our analysis, we consider an ubiquitous surveillance system that gathers information about a population as a result of, for example, monitoring data and traffic on the Internet, tapping telephone lines and mining social-networking sites. Due to the tremendous amount of information involved, the surveillance system must necessarily automate the gathering of such data and their posterior analysis. We assume a surveillance system that relies on automated computer software to carry out both tasks, and that reports to human investigators only when it detects patterns of individuals that can be classified as terrorists. Our analysis of the cost of this system assumes, however, that the cost of this automated, computerized monitoring is negligible compared to that of human inspection.
For the sake of illustration, this work considers hypothesis testing for the automated detection process. Specifically, we assume that the monitoring system applies a binary hypothesis test [11, §11] to find out whether one observed element of data has been distributed according to a PMF τ which captures a terrorist's characteristic behavior, or a distribution ν which reflects common patterns among innocents. We shall refer to those two distributions also as the terrorist and innocent profiles. Fig. 1 provides an example of such distributions that might reflect the Web-browsing habits of those profiles. FIGURE 1. We show a simple but illustrative example of the PMFs characterizing what might be regarded as terrorist and innocent Web-browsing patterns in a Muslim country. The profiles τ (terrorist) and ν (innocent) here depicted correspond to the probability distribution of the pages visited across the Web. Conceptually, these artificial profiles tell us that 15% of all page visits by a terrorist would be to the site islamic-news.info, whereas this would be just 6% in the case of an innocent.
The choice of this detection model is justified by our aim to make the analysis as illustrative as possible. We give priority to explainability and avoid complex models that can make decision-making and cost-analysis altogether inscrutable. Being an extraordinarily popular and powerful statistical method, hypothesis testing is in this sense a suitable approach as it allows reasoning about several (in our case, two) insightful and mathematically tractable models of behavior. From the standpoint of evaluation, besides, more VOLUME 6, 2018 sophisticated approaches like machine-learning algorithms typically require tremendous amounts of data for training, which are not available in the case of terrorism. Precisely, hypothesis testing is also justified for the type of experimental data available to us. We shall describe later in Sec. IV-A that the only reliable terrorism-related data that is publicly available is given in the form of probability distributions of socio-demographic attributes. This is precisely the type of data model required in hypothesis testing.
Let H be a Bernoulli r.v. of parameter θ representing the two possible hypothesis about the distribution of the observed data. More precisely, H = 1 with probability θ , which denotes that the data has been drawn according to the terrorist profile τ ; and H = 2 with probability 1 − θ , which indicates that it has been generated from the innocent profile ν. Said otherwise, X conditioned on H has PMF τ when H = 1, and ν when H = 2.
A randomized estimator or detectorĤ of H is a probabilistic decision rule determined by the conditional probability pĤ |X . The interpretation of such estimator is as follows: if X is observed to have value j, the detector concludes H = 1 with probability pĤ |X (1|j), and H = 2 otherwise. Note that deterministic estimators are a particular case of randomized detectors.
The performance of a decision rule is typically characterized in terms of its error and detection probabilities. The probability of a false positive, which we shall also refer to as misidentification rate, is the probability that an innocent be considered as a terrorist by the surveillance system, that is, pĤ |H (1|2). The probability of a true positive, on the other hand, is the probability of correctly identifying terrorists, i.e., pĤ |H (1|1). We shall also regard this probability as the accuracy rate. The probabilities of false and true negatives are defined analogously. Table 1 provides a summary of the notation used throughout this work.
B. THE FALSE-POSITIVE PARADOX
This section reviews a fairly well-known result in statistics, namely, the false-positive paradox [14] .
Consider a very pessimistic or paranoic vision of the current situation of terrorism, in which a 0.1% of the population in France is terrorist. With a population of approximately 70 million people, we could regard this figure of 70 000 terrorists as a worst-case scenario or loose upper bound.
Suppose that the French intelligence agency Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure has a surveillance system such as the one described in Sec. II-A, with access to a wide range of personal information including Internet, phone-call and banking records. In addition, assume that the agency has a highly accurate detection system at its disposal, with a true positive rate of 99% and a probability of false positive of 0.5%.
Bearing in mind all these assumptions, now we wonder about the reliability of a positive detection. In other words, given an individual who has been labeled as a terrorist by the automated detection system, what would be the probability that s/he has been correctly identified as such?
From Bayes' theorem, it is immediate to verify that such probability, which in information retrieval is called precision [13] , yields
which means that, on average, just one out of six positive tests will in fact correspond to a terrorist. In the example given, the large number of false positives -compared to the number of true positives-appears to be contradictory: the accuracy and misidentification rates show a detection system that is certainly precise; but in reality, if an individual is classified as a terrorist, the probability that the system is correct is only 1 6 . This is known as the false-positive paradox and it arises when the overall population has a low incidence of terrorism (or of a health condition, in the case of medical testing) and this incidence rate is lower than the probability of a false positive.
The upshot is that, in a current state of affairs with fortunately very few terrorists -fewer in proportion to the false positive rate-more innocents will be misidentified as terrorists than terrorists correctly identified. In terms of resource efficiency, this has a straightforward consequence: the surveillance system will require to investigate on all people classified as terrorists, when in most cases they will be innocent citizens. (1), is plotted for different values of accuracy and misidentification rates, as a function of the ratio θ of terrorists to total population. Recall that the accuracy rate of a test is defined as the probability of correctly identifying terrorists, i.e., pĤ |H (1|1). The rate of misidentification of a test is defined as the probability of incorrectly classifying innocents, that is, pĤ |H (1|2). As noted from this figure, the false-positive paradox is observed when θ is estimated lower than the misidentification rate.
Finally, although we have opted for explainability and thus skipped complex machine-learning approaches that could obscure the analysis, we would like to establish a connection between the false-positive paradox and a common problem in machine learning. Specifically, the conditions under which the paradox occurs, are intimately related to the imbalanced-data problem of said field. This problem arises when the number of observations belonging to one class is significantly lower than those belonging to the other class/es. As explained above, the paradox is a consequence of the fact that terrorism is a rare phenomenon, which limits the availability of data and therefore makes terrorism detection the type of imbalanced-data problems of machine learning.
III. A COST MODEL FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE
In the background section, we roughly evaluated the probability that an individual labeled as a terrorist be, in fact, a terrorist. For the sake of clarity, in that section we ignored the dependence between accuracy and misidentification rates. In this section, first we succinctly illustrate the variables that characterize these two rates; then we propose a quantitative measure of the economic cost of a mass surveillance program; and finally, we formulate a detector aimed at minimizing the overall cost of such monitoring.
As we shall show in the coming sections, the purpose of assuming cost-optimized detectors is to obtain representative lower bounds on the expenditures of such surveillance programs. The actual implication of basing our analysis on minimum-cost detection will therefore be an underestimation of the real costs of a monitoring system, since any other non-optimized detector will obviously yield higher costs.
Using basic probability theory, we can immediately check the relationship between the accuracy and the misidentification rates. For i, j = 1, 2, note that
and in particular that
where the symbol '' , '' denotes the standard inner product on R n , and pĤ |X (1|·), τ and ν are interpreted here as vectors. Two evident albeit insightful observations stem from (2) . First, as fully expected, we note that the accuracy and misidentification rates depend on the reference, characteristic distributions that describe the behaviors of a terrorist and an innocent. Secondly, we observe that both rates are subject to the decision rule that concludes when an individual is a terrorist. The reference distributions are the result of profiling both terrorists and innocents based on the available data, and can be seen as input parameters of the estimator. The decision rule, on the other hand, is determined by the particular optimality criterion chosen to design it.
In hypothesis testing, there exist several optimality criteria for decision-making. One may wish to minimize a convex combination of false positives and false negatives (Bayes criterion), may want to minimize the maximum of the two errors (minimax criterion), or may opt for minimizing one of the two error probabilities subject to a constraint on the other (Neyman-Pearson rule) [16] . Their formulations of the hypothesis test between H = 1 and H = 2 are given, respectively, by
|H (2|1) subject to pĤ |H (1|2) γ . In this work, however, we take a different approach. As we shall describe in the following subsections, we choose to minimize a measure of the overall cost of mass surveillance, subject to a minimum percentage of terrorists the security agency wishes to capture. The reason for this different approach is as follows. A detection system designed to satisfy this optimality criterion will yield the minimum number of resources required to capture a given percentage of terrorists. Obviously, any other detection system, including the classical Bayes, minimax and Neyman-Pearson, will yield higher costs. If we show that the minimum number of resources (attained by this detection system) is far beyond the reach of any national security agency, then we will demonstrate that mass surveillance is not cost-effective.
A. MEASURE OF THE OVERALL ECONOMIC COST
Our measure of the total cost of a surveillance system revolves around the false-positive paradox and the fact that each alarm requires a costly investigation to decide whether it is real or not.
As mentioned in Sec. II-B, one of the consequences of the reduced incidence of terrorists is that the monitoring system VOLUME 6, 2018 will require further investigation of the set of individuals labeled as terrorists, a set with, unluckily, a large number of false positives compared to the number of true positives. We denote this set of ''still-suspects'' by S.
We assume that the agents of the intelligence service, who are in charge of examining this set, proceed in a serial manner, that is, they do not undertake a new investigation until an individual is correctly identified as innocent or terrorist -this can be justified in terms of the limited although often tremendously large number of resources available to an agency. Our analysis of the economic cost per suspect, however, is valid regardless of the number of agents working in parallel on a partition of S, under the reasonable assumption that simple random sampling is employed.
Given a subset of S, the number of individuals that an agent will have to investigate until they identify a terrorist is clearly a geometric r.v. with parameter p H |Ĥ (1|1) . We denote by C c the cost of checking the true status of one particular individual within S. This would include, for example, the costs of tracking, detaining and interrogating them. 1 Recall that the expected value of a geometrically distributed discrete r.v. is the inverse of its parameter. Accordingly, for θ > 0 we define the cost per terrorist C t of a security agency as
The total cost T of the surveillance program is defined intuitively by multiplying C t by the number of true positives. We would like to emphasize that this latter measure of cost is also independent of the number of agents involved in the inspection of S. The number of human resources with this aim has only an impact on the time taken by this examination. We propose measuring the total cost of a surveillance system essentially as the cardinality of S. The cost per terrorist, on the other hand, is roughly defined as the ratio of positive tests to true positives, i.e., I ∪ T / T .
The proposed measures of cost can also be interpreted in terms of the sets of false positives and true positives. This is illustrated in Fig. 3 , where we denote those sets by I and T , respectively. Consistently with the false-positive paradox, this figure shows a set I much larger than T . Recall that we defined S as the set of suspects, that is, S = I ∪ T . Accordingly, it is straightforward to check that C t /C c = |S| / |T | and that T /C c = |S|. In a nutshell, we may regard our measure of total cost essentially as the number of suspects listed by the automated detector.
B. COST-OPTIMIZED DETECTION
Having defined a metric of the overall economic cost of a surveillance system, a detector may be designed to minimize it, maybe accompanied with some constraints on the probabilities of error and detection. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the only purpose of considering minimum-cost detectors in our analysis is to obtain lower bounds on the expenditures of mass surveillance.
In this work, we contemplate two equivalent design principles for such detector. Our first design considers the case in which the intelligence agency wishes to minimize the total cost of its surveillance system, while ensuring that a target, minimum percentage of terrorists κ min is captured, 2 or equivalently, that a maximum rate of false negatives 1 − κ min is attained. The formulation of the corresponding detector is given by
where the inequality constraint may be replaced equivalently by pĤ
We shall denote by T * the minimum total cost attained by said detector. We hasten to stress that, in the trivial case when θ = 0, a positive κ min does not make sense. On the other hand, when θ > 0, a target percentage of terrorists to be caught of κ min = 0 leads clearly to a minimum total cost T * = 0. Our second design approaches the complementary case to (3). That is, it considers a scenario in which the security agency wants to maximize the number of captured terrorists within a maximum budget β max . Said otherwise, we simply contemplate exchanging the objective and the constraint functions of the previous detector.
In this case, the formulation of the associated detector is given by the optimization problem
It can be shown, however, that this latter optimization problem characterizes the same optimal trade-off between total cost and accuracy rate described by (3) . Consequently, because the analysis of either of these two formulations will yield entirely equivalent results, the following subsections will just refer to (3) for simplicity.
Lastly, we would like to make a couple of remarks. First, note that the proposed formulation may in fact be regarded as a multi-objective optimization problem, in the sense that there are two conflicting objectives that we want to optimize simultaneously: a security agency would want to minimize costs while maximizing the number of caught terrorists. Secondly, although we have opted for explainability and hence avoided complex machine-learning approaches, it is interesting to observe that the computation of the solution to this optimization problem might be viewed as the process of training a machine-learning model.
C. ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we illustrate our formulation and the different parameters involved in the design of a detection system. We proceed by examining some simple but insightful examples of terrorist and innocent distributions. Although later on in Sec. IV we will explore the actual cost of a mass monitoring system from real-world socio-demographic data of jihadist terrorists, the study of certain artificial profiles in the following subsections will help us understand the impact of profile similarity, among other aspects, on the economics of online surveillance.
The section is organized as follows. First, we review in Sec. III-C.1 two common metrics of distribution distance. Then, Sec. III-C.2 shows our examples of reference profiles. And finally we present some numerical results in Sec. III-C.3.
1) MEASURES OF PROFILE SIMILARITY
As we showed in Sec. III, the performance of a detector is determined by the reference distributions τ and ν that model terrorist and innocent behaviors. Although not explicitly stated in that section, it is clear that the error and detection probabilities, as well as the corresponding cost of the surveillance system, will largely depend on to what extent these two profiles diverge. Intuitively, the more dissimilar these profiles are, the lower is the probability of incorrectly identifying individuals and hence the cost of the system. To quantify the impact of profile similarity on said cost, this section briefly introduces two measures of statistical distance between distributions, namely the cosine distance and the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence.
Despite the variety of similarity metrics available in the literature, we selected the cosine distance and the KL divergence, two well-known measures of discrepancy between distributions, for two main reasons. On the one hand, the former is essentially an inner product, which may reflect some sort of profile orthogonality in the sense non-overlapping distributions. On the other hand, Chernoff-Stein's lemma relates KL divergence with probabilities of error in hypothesis testing [11] .
The cosine distance [19] is a simple and robust measure of dissimilarity between vectors, and is defined as
where · denotes the Euclidean norm. It is important to notice that the cosine distance is not a proper metric as it does not satisfy the triangle inequality. 3 Nevertheless, it does provide a measure of distance: in the case of probability distributions, it ranges from 0, meaning the PMFs are identical, to 1, indicating orthogonality. The second distance measure we shall utilize to explore the effect of profile similarity on the cost of a surveillance system is the KL divergence, a fundamental quantity in information theory that arises, for instance, in the (optimal) likelihood ratio test of the Neyman-Pearson formulation [11] . The KL divergence between τ and ν is defined as
When not specified, the base of the logarithms in the expression above is taken to base 2. Exactly as with the cosine distance, the KL divergence is not a metric as it is neither symmetric nor satisfies the triangle inequality. It provides, however, a measure of discrepancy between distributions, in the sense that D(τ ν) 0, with equality if, and only if, τ = ν.
2) SCENARIOS
Our analysis is carried out for some examples of reference profiles, under the assumption that these profiles are modeled as PMFs, that is, as histograms of relative frequencies of data (from terrorists and innocents) within an arbitrary alphabet. This profile representation as relative histograms coincides with the only socio-demographic data available on jihadist terrorism (see Sec. IV).
Throughout this series of examples, we shall assume a surveillance system monitoring a population of 70 million people, like in France, approximately. The results presented in next section are shown for the six pairs of distributions (τ j , ν j ) 6 j=1 depicted in Fig. 4 . The number of data categories considered in our analysis is n = 3. Similarly to Fig. 1 , i = 1, 2 could be two pages related to Islamic extremism, and i = 3 the rest of the Web.
The pairs of profiles represented in that figure merely attempt to reflect some plausible scenarios in regards to the similarity between the two PMFs. The scenarios have been chosen to capture three possible situations, namely, when the profiles are relatively similar (Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) ), when they are very dissimilar (Figs. 4(d) , 4(e), 4(f)), and lastly an intermediate scenario (Fig. 4(c) ). Although in Sec. III-C.1 we introduced two quantitative measure of discrepancy between distributions, we shall also refer to those scenarios in qualitative terms, from low (scenario a) to high (scenario f ) dissimilarity, consistently with the fact that C(τ i ν i ) and D(τ i ν i ) are strictly increasing with i (the more dissimilar the profiles τ i and ν i are, the larger the corresponding values of cosine distance and KL divergence). Fig 5 shows the values FIGURE 4 . Examples of probability distributions for terrorists τ and innocents ν, sorted from (a) to (f ) in decreasing order of similarity.
FIGURE 5.
We show the approximate values of dissimilarity between the terrorist and innocent distributions plotted in Fig. 4 . The similarities between these pairs of profiles may be described informally as ''nearly identical'' (a), ''similar'' (b), ''fairly different'' (c), ''rather orthogonal'' (d ), ''nearly orthogonal'' (e) and ''completely orthogonal'' (f ).
of dissimilarity between each of the pairs of profiles assumed in our analysis.
3) NUMERICAL RESULTS
We illustrate our formulation by examining, first, the example of distributions shown in Fig. 4(c) , which represents an intermediate case in terms of profile similarity-a cosine distance of approximately 0.2583 seems to indicate this. We consider a ratio of terrorists to total population θ = 0.1, 4 and assume that the intelligence agency wishes to capture at least κ min = 75% of them.
Throughout this section, we shall conveniently represent randomized detectors in matrix terms, in particular as R 2×n matrices. Accordingly, the detector that minimizes the total cost for the pair (τ 3 , ν 3 ) is given by pĤ |X =
1.000 1.000 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.833 , 4 Recall that the permille symbol indicatespartsperthousand.Accord-
where the entry i, j is the probability of decidingĤ = i when X = j is observed. The estimator above has been computed numerically, using the method mentioned in Sec. III-C.2, and tells us that an individual will be considered innocent only when X = 3, and with probability 0.833. The corresponding accuracy and misidentification rates can be obtained straightforwardly from this matrix and the reference distributions, through the expression (2). They yield 0.75 and 0.50, respectively. Recall that T /C c is the number of suspects that the agents of the surveillance system will have to further investigate on an individual basis. For the estimator at hand, this number reaches the high figure of 35 001 750 individuals, just about half of the population assumed. The low-similarity cases e and f will show next that this enormous cost, given above in number of suspects, is in part a consequence of the similarity between τ 3 and ν 3 . Fig. 4 (e) represents two distributions such that ν 2 > τ 2 = 0. Intuitively, this means that, if X = 2, the individual in question will never be regarded as a terrorist, which will have an impact on the misidentification rate and therefore on the total cost of the system. For the same values of θ and κ min , and for the PMFs (τ 5 , ν 5 ), the estimator that solves (3) is given by pĤ |X = 0.773 0.000 0.000 0.227 1.000 1.000 .
An interesting observation that follows from this detector is the relatively low value of pĤ |X (1|1). At first sight, this may seem surprising since the probability of observing X = 1 for a terrorist (97%) is much higher than that for an innocent (1%). However, this is an expected consequence of the optimality criterion chosen. To illustrate this, simply note that a probability pĤ |X (1|1) > 0.773 would imply, from (2), an accuracy rate pĤ |H (1|1) = pĤ |X (1|1)τ 5 1 > κ min . Such a detector would obviously be feasible, on account of the inequality constraint imposed in (3). But certainly, it would give a greater number of true positives and thus would incur a higher cost.
As anticipated, the performance of this detector is much better than that of scenario c. The misidentification rate is reduced significantly, yielding pĤ |X (1|1) ν 5 1 = 0.773%, and the minimum number of suspects to investigate T * /C c drops to 546 433 individuals. This latter figure represents 1.56% of the total cost of case c.
Not entirely unexpectedly, these results are further enhanced by the extreme case f, which we represent in Fig. 4(f) . For the same θ = 0.1 but for a more stringent requirement κ min = 1, the optimal estimator is given by pĤ |X =
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 , which concludes that an individual is a terrorist if, and only if, X = 1. Naturally, T * /C c attains the total number of terrorists, 7 000, and the probabilities of true-positive and false-positive tests become 1 and 0 respectively. Simply put, the surveillance system does not misidentify any terrorist and any innocent. Compared to case e, this implies a reduction of 98.72% in total cost. The relative increment in cosine distance between the scenarios e and f, however, is only 4.33%, which seems to indicate that this said distance is not suitable to quantify significant differences in overall cost. The KL divergence, on the contrary, appears to capture this notable reduction in T * .
FIGURE 6.
We plot the minimum cost per terrorist, given in number of suspects per true positives, as a function of the ratio θ of terrorists to total number of individuals. We assume that the intelligence agency aims at capturing, at least, κ min = 75% of those terrorists.
Recall that C t /C c is the ratio of positive tests (i.e., individuals labeled as terrorists by the automated detection system) to true positives tests, that is, the inverse of precision. For a fixed κ min = 75%, Fig. 6 shows the value of such ratio, which results from dividing the minimum total cost T * /C c by the number of true positives. Later on we shall examine this minimum total cost for a range of percentages of κ min . The displayed results correspond to the six pairs of distributions represented in Fig. 4 .
Consistently with our previous observations about the total-cost metric, we note that those cases in which the differences between τ and ν are more pronounced lead to lower minimum costs per terrorist. In all but case f, we also observe a ratio C t /C c that increases exponentially as θ approaches 0; clearly, our measure of cost per terrorist is not defined at this extreme value. The behavior of these ratios are in line with the conclusions drawn in Sec. II-B about the large number of false positives-compared to the number of true positives. As an example, for θ 0.1 we notice that cases a-e would require examining, on average, a minimum of 100 suspects to capture one terrorist. The extreme case f, then again, yields an expected minimum ratio of 1 positive test per terrorist, regardless of the ratio of terrorists assumed. Fig. 7 , on the other hand, shows the dependence of the minimum total cost T * /C c on the ratio of terrorists. The curves are also plotted for κ min = 75% and θ ∈ (0, 0.2]. Although T is defined for θ = 0, this figure does not represent such values since we are considering a positive κ min . Fig. 7 (a) confirms the intuitive, preliminary findings suggested at the beginning of this section: the higher the similarity between the reference distributions, the higher the minimum overall cost. The results indicate that T * is roughly linear with the ratio of terrorists. Fig. 7(b) plots the derivative of T * /C c with respect to θ , which, in addition, allows us to appreciate the relatively low rates of increase guessed in Fig. 7(a) . An interesting observation arising from this former figure is that an increase in the ratio of terrorists θ = δ leads to an increase in the minimum total cost T * < δ. Informally, this means that a possible overestimate of the ratio of terrorists by the intelligence agency would not have a great impact in terms of cost-at least for the distributions considered here. Lastly, consistently with Fig. 6 , we check that case f yields T * /C c = 5 250, that is, the total number of terrorists the agency aims at capturing.
The optimal trade-off between total cost and accuracy rate is illustrated in Fig. 8 for θ = 0.1. The figure plots, more specifically, the minimum quotient T /C c as a function of the minimum percentage of terrorists κ min the surveillance system wants to capture. Conversely, for a maximum budget β max /C c (in number of suspects to investigate), it gives us the maximum number of terrorists caught.
The trade-off curves are plotted again for the six examples of reference profiles. Remarkably enough, we observe that such curves exhibit a convex, piecewise-linear behavior, analogously to the receiver operating curve of the Neyman-Pearson test [7] . This observation has an evident practical implication. In the scenario c, for instance, we can observe that an increase of 1 in κ min (i.e., an increase of 7 terrorists) leads to examining 212 more suspects; this occurs provided that κ min is between 0% and 50%. However, this same increase in the interval [69%, 100%] implies investigating much more suspects, namely, 1 398 more.
On the other hand, Fig. 8 shows relatively low values of total cost in those cases where the corresponding profiles are more dissimilar. For example, case e, with VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 7. Minimum total cost, given in number of suspects, and its derivative with respect to the ratio of terrorists (per mille) for κ min = 75%.
FIGURE 8.
Optimal trade-off between the cost of a surveillance system, given in number of individuals to investigate, and the minimum percentage of terrorists this system is required to capture. In this figure, we assume a ratio of terrorists to total population θ = 0.1.
6.2528, yields only T * /C c = 36 310 individuals for κ min = 50%. The scenario with the most similar profiles, in contrast, indicates that half of the population should be investigated. Also, we note that the quotient T * /C c in cases a-c becomes the size of the whole population when κ min = 1. In cases d and e such quotient is slightly reduced, being approximately 90% and 95% of the total number of individuals. Finally, in accordance with our previous observations about the cost per terrorist, case f gives the total number of terrorists, multiplied by the factor κ min .
Our last figure, Fig. 9 , illustrates the impact that profile similarity, quantified through the two distance measures introduced in Sec. III-C.1, may have on total cost. In particular, this figure shows the minimum T /C c versus the KL divergence and the cosine distance, for θ = 0.1 and for each of the examples of distributions plotted in Fig. 4 . We assume κ min = 50% and, consequently, the abscissa ranges from approximately half of the number of terrorists to about half of the overall population.
Apart from the fact that the minimum total cost decreases with these two measures of profile dissimilarity, an immediate observation is that the KL divergence is more sensitive to cost differences than the cosine distance. For example, from case e to d, T * increases approximately 406.58%, whereas the cosine distance experiences a relative reduction of just 7.19%. This is in contrast to KL divergence, which drops by 38.73%.
Another interesting remark is that this latter measure may capture the interesting scenario when τ i > 0 and ν i = 0 for some i = 1, . . . , n, for which D(τ ν) = ∞. Precisely, this corresponds to case f, which gives the minimum attainable total cost, 3 500. We must hasten to stress, however, that this does not imply that any pair of distributions satisfying the above requirements will lead to this minimum total cost value. For example, the KL divergence between the distributions τ = (0, 0.3, 0.7) and ν = (0.3, 0, 0.7) is infinite, but T * /C c is around 14 million of positive tests.
The cosine distance, on the other hand, does reflect, in a more general way, this sense of orthogonality observed in the scenario f, which confirms the intuition that orthogonal profiles may lead to minimum attainable total costs and hence calls for the exploration of behavioral models satisfying this property.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we apply the theoretical cost model proposed in Sec. III to investigate certain economic aspects of a real monitoring system. More specifically, we use real-world socio-demographic data of jihadist terrorism in the U.K. and Spain to build terrorist and innocent profiles, and input this information in our cost model to obtain lower bounds on the cost of surveillance and analyze other related aspects. The ultimate aim is to gain insight into the rationality and cost-effectiveness of mass surveillance through real-world data.
Evaluating if the proposed cost model is a good fit of the actual cost of a monitoring program, however, is a challenging task: hardly no information is available publicly about terrorist behavioral patterns, nor the detection methods employed by security agencies, nor the performance of such methods (i.e., misidentification rates), nor the expenditures of mass surveillance in Western countries. Regarding this latter aspect, the real costs of mass surveillance in Spain and the U.K. are, unfortunately, not available. At most, general expenditure figures in defense are public, but the specific budget allocated to surveillance is unknown.
A. DATA COLLECTION
To investigate the economic cost of a real online mass surveillance system, we rely on the socio-demographic profiles elaborated by [5] , [22] , [23] , [27] of jihadists who committed suicide attacks or were convicted for Islamism-related terrorism offenses.
The cited studies were carried out by the Elcano Royal Institute and the Centre for Social Cohesion, and, to the best of our knowledge, constitute the most comprehensive and detailed, publicly available, socio-demographic data of jihadist terrorism in Spain and the U.K. These data, although not related to online activity, often are available online (e.g., in social networks) or can be inferred from this activity.
The first two papers ( [22] , [23] ) analyze the profiles of more than 150 jihadists in Spain during the periods 1995-2003, 2004-2012 and 2013-2016 . The latter two ( [5] , [27] ) provide similar statistics of 126 jihadists in the U.K. for a single period between 1999 and 2009. In both cases, the reported profiles are given in the form of probability distributions, which is the profile-representation model assumed in our work.
As for the innocent profiles, we have considered general population statistics of both countries, under the assumption that θ is close to zero. The data have been gathered from the Spanish Institute of Statistics 5 and the U.K. Office for National Statistics. 6 Seven socio-demographic factors or attributes have been selected for our analysis: gender, age, nationality, 7 country of birth, 8 education, occupation and marital status. All except marital status are available for both the terrorist profiles of Spain and U.K. Table 2 shows the factors considered in our analysis and Figs. 10, 11 and 12 the terrorist and innocent profiles for each of these factors. Finally, we would like to note that the terrorist profiles computed by the cited papers cover different time lengths. Specifically, terrorist data are aggregated into periods of 9 and 4 years in the case of Spain, and 10 years in the case of the U.K. Since such data are not available on a per-year basis, we cannot quantify the evident impact of such different time lengths on the estimation of the corresponding profiles and, hence, on the cost of the monitoring system itself.
B. RESULTS
Our experimental analysis is divided into two main blocks. On the one hand, we consider the case in which 7 Nationality is a legal relationship involving allegiance on the part of an individual and usually protection on the part of the state [1] . Nationality is acquired by birth or adoption, marriage, or descent; the specifics vary from country to country. 8 Country of birth is the country where a person was born. socio-demographic data are analyzed independently by the surveillance system. Although no practical system would rely on a single factor to make a final decision on whether an individual is terrorist or innocent, we study this case here with the aim of investigating the economic impact of each factor alone. On the other hand, we examine the more realistic Finally, we shall also explore the evolution of such costs over time in Spain.
1) INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
We begin by examining the data corresponding to Spain and the period 1995-2003. Fig. 15 shows the statistical distance VOLUME 6, 2018 between the terrorist and innocent distributions of each factor. As we can observe, the larger profile differences correspond to the factor country of birth (no. 4). On the other extreme, the level of education and marital status are the socio-economic attributes with the least differences between distributions.
Our observations about profile similarity are consistent with Fig. 13(a) , where we show the minimum cost per terrorist as a function of θ for κ min = 75%. In this figure and the following ones, θ goes from 0 a 0.2 per mille. The value θ = 0.2 represents a worst-case scenario with an estimation of 9 300 terrorists by a Spanish security agency. The larger difference between the terrorist and innocent profiles for factor 4 leads to C t /C c ≈ 487.53 when θ = 0.1. For factors 5 and 7, on the other hand, the average number of suspects that must be investigated to capture one terrorist is 9 121 and 7 943, respectively. Fig. 13(b) shows the minimum total cost vs θ for κ min = 75%. In line with our previous observations on the cost per terrorist, we appreciate that the country of birth is the indicator exhibiting the minimum ratio T * /C c . Specifically, for any ratio of terrorists in the interval θ ∈ (0, 0.2], a detection system operating with this indicator would require checking the true status of approximately 1 489 000 suspects. This figure would be just the 5.45% of the number of people to be investigated if the level of education was the only attribute available to the detector.
We plot in Fig. 13 (c) the trade-off between minimum total cost and accuracy rate for θ = 0.1, or said otherwise, the minimum number of suspects for whom agents need to conduct further investigations with the aim of capturing a minimum, target percentage of terrorists. As can be observed, the cost of a detection system based solely on the country of birth is kept at a relatively low level for κ min 95%. This is in stark contrast to all but the gender attribute, for which we note that the total number of suspects to be inspected for the same value of κ min becomes approximately the entire population. In the case of the gender factor, however, the fact all terrorists are male in the period under study leads to checking just about half of the population in Spain.
An interesting observation in Fig. 13(c) is the different number of line segments in each T * /C c curve. Clearly, this follows from the different alphabet sizes of each factor and has a quite straightforward implication: the single-factor detector with minimum total cost may rely on different attributes depending on the target percentage of terrorists to be caught. In the case at hand, the optimal trade-off curve is given by the country of birth and gender, the latter yielding the minimum cost for κ min 98.2% approximately.
Next, we analyze the period corresponding to 2004-2012 for Spain. First, we start by examining the differences in terms of cosine distance and KL divergence between the terrorist and innocents profiles of the 7 attributes under study. Fig. 16 shows the most dissimilar profiles are those corresponding to country of birth and nationality, whereas the most similar ones refer to occupation. We note that the distance values corresponding to nationality are rather larger in comparison with those of period 1995-2003, namely, 70.44% in cosine distance and 12.38% in KL divergence. The reason for this larger differences can be seen in Fig. 10 , where we note a relative increase in the number of terrorists with Morocco and Pakistan as country of birth, compared to the previous period. Specifically, we notice that the ratio τ 4 1 /ν 4 1 of terrorists to innocents born in Morocco is around 3.9 larger than in 1995-2003. For terrorist and innocents born in Pakistan, this rate of increase is roughly 3.20.
The results plotted in Fig. 14(a) for the cost per terrorist are consistent with our observations above on profile distance. Particularly, as illustrated in Sec. III-C, we note that the larger the dissimilarity between the terrorist and innocent PMFs, the smaller the ratio C t /C c .
One of the most remarkable results is the notable reduction in cost per terrorist with respect to 1995-2003. Checking the true status of a terrorist during the period 2004-2012 would require, on average, the examination of 162.55 innocents for θ = 0.1, which represents a drop of 66.53%, compared to the previous period.
The minimum total cost of a monitoring system is shown in Fig. 14(b) for κ min = 75% and different values of θ .
Not entirely unexpectedly, we observe a similar reduction in the number of investigations required to capture that target percentage of terrorists. For example, for θ = 0.1, we go from 1 489 000 investigations to ''just'' 570 100, which accounts for a 61.71 percent decrease with respect to 1995-2003.
As with the previous period, country of birth and gender are also the factors that determine the optimal trade-off curve between total cost and accuracy rate. However, as can be observed in Fig. 14(c) , the ratios T * /C c are slightly greater as κ min approaches 1, which is simply a consequence of a larger population in the period at hand.
Another interesting observation is that, for κ min up to 84%, a detection system based on the nationality attribute alone would be almost as costly as one system based on country of birth. This is in contrast to the period 1995-2003, where this pattern is observed only for κ min < 50%.
Next, we examine the period 2013-2016. Unlike the two previous cases, here we observe our two statistical measures are not fully consistent. In particular, we note that the largest discrepancy between distributions in cosine distance is found for the attribute age, whereas country of birth is the factor exhibiting the greatest divergence between terrorist and innocent profiles. From Fig. 18 , we also see that factors 1, 3 and 4 yield relatively much larger values of cosine distance than in the two previous periods, whereas the opposite is observed for attributes 2 and 7. In terms of KL divergence, on the contrary, factors 3 and 4 show much larger discrepancies than in the periods 1995-2003 and 2004-2012 . The most relevant observation, however, is that the maximum difference between distributions in the current period is much smaller than in the two previous time intervals. As we shall see next, all this will VOLUME 6, 2018 have a greater impact on the ability of a detection system to discriminate between terrorist and innocent behavior and thus on its economic cost.
In Fig. 17 (a) we observe that age gives the lowest cost per terrorist for any θ . This should come as no surprise, however, since this attribute yields the largest cosine distance between the corresponding terrorist and innocent profiles. The fact that the divergence value between these two profiles is relatively small (compared to those of nationality and country of birth) seems to indicate that cosine distance is a better indicator of the cost per terrorist in the period at hand.
For θ = 0.1, we check that C t /C c ≈ 3 288, which implies that a single-factor monitoring program in this period would be 6.75 and 20.23 times more costly than those of periods 1995-2003 and 2004-2012 , respectively.
The overall cost of such a monitoring program is shown in Fig. 17(b) . For any θ in the interval under study, the number of suspects to be investigated becomes roughly 11 480 000. This figure represents an increase of as much as 770.98 and 2 013.70 percent with respect to the two previous periods.
Concordantly, the trade-off curves between T * /C c and κ min yield more costly detection systems. We observe in Fig. 17(c) that the optimal trade-off is determined by the attributes country of birth and age; these are the factors giving the least overall cost. Compared to the previous periods, we can observe now that κ min = 1 cannot be attained for a fraction of the population. Put differently, if a security agency would have aimed to capture all terrorists in the period 2012-2016, it would have to investigate nearly 46 million people. In a nutshell, the results yielded by our analysis appear to suggest that the period 2012-2016 represents the worst-case scenario in terms of cost-effectiveness in Spain.
We now examine the case of the U.K. As all available data is aggregated in a single period, 1999-2009, we shall not be able to analyze the cost of a monitoring system over time.
We proceed by checking the statistical distance between the terrorist and innocent profiles of the 6 factors available for the U.K. Fig. 20 shows relatively moderate values of profile similarity. The cosine distance attains the maximum value for the attribute age, whereas country of birth is the one yielding The minimum total cost is represented in Fig. 19 (b) for κ min = 75%. For the factor age and any θ , we see this quotient is approximately 14 130 000, which means the overall cost of a monitoring program implemented in the U.K. in the period 1999-2009 would have been higher than one deployed in Spain. On the other hand, we note that the level of education gives the second least minimum total cost.
An interesting observation that arises from Fig. 19(b) are the tremendous costs of basing detection just on country of birth and nationality for κ min = 75%. This contrasts the case of Spain, especially the periods 1995-2003 and 2004-2012 , where those two factors yielded the least quotients T * /C c . Intuitively, the reason is due to U.K.'s larger tradition of Muslim immigration, a fact that can be verified in Figs. 10 and 12: the percentage of British-born and Spanish-born terrorists is 49% and 4.8% in the U.K. and Spain respectively in the period at hand.
Finally, Fig. 19(c) depicts the trade-off between total cost and percentage of terrorists to be captured. From the figure, we note our observations above do not hold for small to medium values of κ min . In fact, country of birth is the attribute with the least minimum overall cost for κ min 51.5%. Similarly to the case of Spain and the period 2013-2016, this attribute together with age determine the optimal trade-off between total cost and accuracy rate.
2) AGGREGATED FACTORS
Next, we investigate a practical monitoring system that analyzes all factors. The analysis of each factor is assumed to be conducted by a decision module operating on that sole factor, according to Eq. (3). Then, the output of each module is aggregated to make a final decision. 9 In this subsection, we consider the following aggregation strategies:
• At least one. The aggregator module classifies an individual as a terrorist if at least one of the single-factor detectors concludes so.
• Majority. Intuitively, the majority of the single-factor decisions is taken into account. In the case of the U.K., the aggregator flags an individual as a terrorist in the event of a tied vote.
• Cosine-weighted. Let I (j) be the function modeling the decision of the j-th detector, being ''1'' or ''-1'' depending on whether it is terrorist or innocent, respectively. The aggregation function concludes an individual is a terrorist if
We start our analysis by examining the cost per terrorist for Spain and the U.K. For the sake of brevity and because the minimum total cost does not vary significantly with θ , we only show the figures of cost per terrorist vs θ and total cost vs κ min .
We plot the cost per terrorist for the periods under study and both countries in Figs. 21(a) , 21(c), 21(e) and 21(g). From these figures, we can conclude that, in general, the at-leastone and cosine-weighted strategies yield the worst and best results, respectively. We note, also, that the single-factor decision rule outperforms the majority strategy most of the times and, for Spain, the period 1995-2003 and certain values of θ , it may be even more cost-effective than the cosine-weighted rule.
As expected, the combination of factors can effectively reduce the cost per terrorist of single-factor detection. Specifically, we see that, for θ = 0.1, the ratio cost per terrorist to cost of checking for the cosine-weighted rule is approximately 70.63 (Spain, period 2004-2012), 2 760.61 (Spain, period 2013-2016) and 2 735.27 (U.K.), which represents a significant cut. However, while reduced, multiple-factor detection still incurs extraordinarily huge costs since, according to some agencies [24] , at least 33 agents are required to observe a suspect day and night.
The results corresponding to total cost are plotted in Figs. 21(b) , 21(d), 21(f) and 21(h) for θ = 0.1. 10 9 We would like to note the similarity between this evaluation and the testing phase of machine-learning models. We have a classifier per factor and we aim to assess the economic impact of multiple-factor decision. 10 Bear in mind that we do not minimize the overall cost of multiple-factor detection, but the total cost of each single-factor detector instead, according to Eq. (3).
For the periods 1995-2003 and 2004-2012 in Spain, we verify that cosine-weighted is the decision rule giving the best trade-off. This is except for relatively high values of κ min , where single-factor detection is more effective.
The observed results show the tremendously large number of resources required by an agency. For the periods in question, an agency with the capability to follow 18 707 (47 863) suspects would only be able to capture κ min = 50% of terrorists in 1995-2003 (2004-2012) . Since around 30 agents are needed to follow a suspect, the figures above clearly exceed the police workforce of Spain, which was estimated to be between 190 100 and 249 900 in the period 2002-2012 [2] . In other words, with such a workforce, an agency would have not been able to capture said percentage of terrorists and therefore multiple-factor detection would have been more effective than single-factor.
Similar results are obtained for the period 2012-2016 in Spain and 1999-2009 in the U.K., with the difference that the majority rule is the best aggregation strategy for smallto-medium values of κ min . In general, values of κ min close to 1 could not be attained, as the whole police workforce of Spain and the U.K. in the corresponding periods was estimated much below the number of agents required to follow suspects in the order of millions. For κ min = 50%, for example, the total cost or number of suspects to be investigated yields 1 918 668 and 4 698 941 in Spain and the U.K., respectively.
In closing, our results show that multiple-factor detection can reduce the cost of a surveillance system aimed at fighting terrorism. However, the number of false positives remains extremely high even if a small fraction of terrorists is to be captured.
C. DISCUSSION
In recent times, the U.K., France and other Western countries have suffered an intense surge of terrorist activity. As a response to jihadist terrorism, Western governments have taken actions to increase online surveillance at unprecedented levels, increasing the budget allocated for homeland security. The Internet, but also the physical world through the ever-increasing presence of sophisticated video [20] , tracking [21] , [26] and satellite systems [12] is putting us all under surveillance.
However, despite the actions taken, the efficacy of mass surveillance has been called into question. In most recent attacks in Boston, Brussels, Copenhagen, Manchester, London, Paris and Sydney, terrorists had already been identified as potential threats by security agencies, but insufficient resources were put in place.
To the best of our knowledge, few scientific works have studied the cost-effectiveness of mass surveillance in a systematic, rigorous manner. As a matter fact, the few existing papers focus on the cost-benefit of surveillance rather than on its cost-effectiveness. These works include [17] , which analyzes this problem but just for single security devices, and not for the much broader scenario of mass surveillance; and [28] , which proposes a simple risk-analysis methodology to evaluate the cost and benefits of a selection of counter-terrorism strategies to protect critical infrastructures. Finally, a less technical work analyzes statements of intelligence agents in both the U.S. and U.K. to learn about the criteria officials employ in their discourse on effectiveness [9] .
In this work, we start our analysis of the cost-effectiveness of mass surveillance with a review of the false-positive paradox. With an estimated number of terrorists of 657 in Germany (i.e., θ = 0.000795) [30] , terrorism is still a rare phenomenon in Western countries and thus a clear example of the consequences of the false-positive paradox. Even for very precise detectors, misidentification rates are very likely to exceed θ , which means there will more innocents misidentified as terrorists than terrorists correctly identified. The upshot is that human resources will be wasted most of the time checking the true status of innocents.
Our analysis of the expenditures of a monitoring system assumes it applies binary hypothesis testing for decisionmaking. We measure the overall cost essentially as the number of suspects listed by such a decision system, thereby assuming the cost of computerized monitoring is negligible compared to that of human inspection.
In this assumption, we have implicitly taken for granted that a human investigation can correctly identify a suspect either as a terrorist or an innocent. However, our analysis about the rationality and cost-effectiveness of mass surveillance does not require this assumption to hold. Intuitively, if it does not hold, the security budget will be higher than when it does. 11 Hence, the conclusion drawn by our analysis that mass surveillance is not cost-effective is even further supported when perfect human classification is not satisfied.
In our choice of the detection model, we opted for explainability and thus skipped complex machine-learning approaches that could make the analysis less illustrative and obscure. As a matter of fact, the limited transparency offered on decisions made through machine learning is a growing concern in artificial-intelligence research [15] . Being an extraordinarily popular and powerful statistical method, hypothesis testing is an appropriate choice since it permits reasoning quite straightforwardly about two behavioral models.
From the point of view of evaluation, machine-learning algorithms require large amounts of training data, which are not available in the case of terrorism -it is a rare phenomenon and security agencies are reluctant to share information. Hypothesis testing is precisely justified for the type and availability of experimental data. To the best of our knowledge, the only reliable terrorism-related data that is publicly available is given in an aggregated form, as probability distributions of socio-demographic attributes. 11 On the one hand, if an innocent is investigated and the investigation concludes s/he is a terrorist (false positive), the economic cost of this decision will be higher than that of perfect investigation since resources will at least be needed for the individual to be imprisoned and maintained at a detention facility. On the other hand, if a terrorist is investigated and the investigation concludes s/he is an innocent (false negative), the economic cost of this wrong decision will encompass (i) the economic and civil costs of a possible attack carried out by this terrorist; and (ii), if the automated computer software includes the terrorist in the list of suspects again, the costs of a second investigation. Intuitively, the security costs due to non-perfect classification will keep increasing until the individual is correctly classified by a human investigation.
Having elaborated on our choice of a hypothesis-testing model -instead of a more complex machine-learning approach-, we would like to emphasize a connection between the false-positive paradox, the statistical result upon which this work builds, and the unbalanced data set problem arising in machine learning. More concretely, in these kinds of problems, classifiers are employed to sort through huge populations of negative (uninteresting) cases to find a small number of positive (interesting, alarm-worthy) cases. Research on imbalanced classes often considers imbalanced to refer to a minority class of 10-20%. However, in real practice, data sets can be even more imbalanced than this, as it is in fraud detection, medical screening and, of course, terrorism detection. 12 The situation becomes even more complex when the security agency cannot anticipate possible changes in the terrorists' strategy, and hence complete knowledge of the corresponding profile is not possible at the time of detection. Next, we succinctly describe how robust detection may tackle the problem of data uncertainty.
Robust optimization criteria assume that probability distributions may belong to sets of distributions, usually called uncertainty classes. One possible way to design a detection rule in such a case is to consider the worst-case performance over this class. The resulting decision rule is then said to be robust to the uncertainties in the probability distribution. In the problem at hand, decision rules might be designed, accordingly, to allow for some uncertainty in the estimation of the terrorist profile. Just as an example, suppose that the probability of female terrorism has been observed to be zero in the last years, but the agency considers this behavior may change at some point. In this case, the distribution corresponding to terrorist behavior could be defined to belong to an uncertainty class where the probability of being women is between zero and a parameter p > 0 (e.g., p = 3%).
In relation to the rationality of mass surveillance, much of current debate revolves around the need of expanding security services and devoting more resources to counterterrorism [3] , [8] . However, our experimental results suggest that an inconceivable number of agents, as large as the population itself, would be required to completely eradicate terrorism. For less ambitious objectives, surveillance is not cost-effective, either: in the period 2013-2016 in Spain, and also in the U.K., at least 50% of terrorist would have been captured at the cost of inspecting a suspect list of around 1 million people. Since 33 agents are needed to follow a suspect, the figures speak for themselves.
Our results show that the total cost increases linearly with the ratio of terrorists, but the rate of 12 Learning from imbalanced data has been investigated quite actively in machine learning and some approaches include (i) balancing the training set by oversampling (undersampling) the minority (majority) class; by synthesizing new minority classes; and (ii) adopting an anomaly detection approach. This latter approach contemplates clustering methods, one-class support-vector machines, and isolation forests [18] . increase is relatively low in all scenarios. As depicted in Figs. 13(b), 14(b), 17(b) and 19(b), 13 the total cost is similar regardless of the percentage of terrorists. This is a compelling observation because this means that, when a security agency has to decide the budget, it does not have to be very accurate in estimating the percentage of terrorists within the population.
Our study has established some connections between two well-known measures of distribution discrepancy, and the overall cost of a monitoring program. The use of such distance measures has showed that building orthogonal representations of terrorist and innocent behaviors seems to be the only way to keep surveillance costs down. For this to be possible, one option would be defining more specific, fine-grained categories that reduce or eliminate the overlaps between profiles.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our results about the cost-effectiveness of mass surveillance are difficult to compare with the situation on the ground, since no information about the actual cost is publicly available. As a matter of fact, governments typically hide their surveillance programs from the public. That being said, in our favor is the fact that our analysis is conducted under quite mild assumptions about the underlying detection system.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper aims to provide insight into the cost-effectiveness of a large-scale surveillance system and to address the issue of whether it is a rational solution to counter terrorism.
We have conducted a mathematical analysis that builds upon the false-positive paradox. Our cost model assumes the surveillance system conducts binary hypothesis tests to decide whether an individual is a terrorist or an innocent. Each decision is made to minimize a measure of total cost, subject to a constraint on the percentage of terrorists to capture. The reason for this decision-making is to derive minimum attainable costs for mass surveillance.
We have applied the proposed theoretical model to analyze the cost of a surveillance system deployed in Spain and the U.K. Different periods have been considered to this end, ranging from 1995 to 2016 in the case of Spain, and from 1999 to 2009 in the case of the U.K.
Our experiments have drawn on the profiles elaborated by Elcano Royal Institute (Spain) and the Centre for Social Cohesion (U.K.), which investigated a variety of socio-demographic attributes of more than 250 jihadist terrorists. On the basis of probability distribution models, we have provided indicative and representative figures of the cost-effectiveness of mass surveillance and examined its rationality.
Future research will explore the case when a sequence of observed data, not a single piece of information, is used for decision-making. In this case, empirical distributions could be computed from such observed data and then matched with 13 For brevity, we did not show the figures of total cost vs θ for multiple-factor detection. The rates of increase of T /C c are similar to those of single-factor detection.
the reference profiles of terrorists and innocents. On the other hand to further support our analysis of the cost-effectiveness of mass surveillance, future work will investigate measures of distribution discrepancies beyond cosine distance and KL divergence, that capture some sort of profile orthogonality. For this, the study of learning-based metrics [31] , [32] will be an interesting strand of research, provided that suitable, real-world examples of terrorist and innocent behavior are publicly available.
